I'm in Brussels now, I suppose it's time to sp(r)out wisdom, or somesuch. I was thinking of the ontological argument, or rather the variant, which comes down to, simply:
(1) Being real is a positive quality
(2) The greatest conceivable being posesses all positive qualities
(3) The greatest conceivable being must be real.
A senseless argument, but not a necessarily illogical one. However, it seems to me that this argument actually presupposes the existence in fact of a greatest conceivable being, while in the above argument it is simply a theoretical construct. If you look at (2), you see that a beleif in the greatest conceivable being, otherwise, it would need the caveat "should the greatest conceivable being be real" prior to the text currently in (2). Viewed as such, (3) is merely "Should the greatest conceivable being be real, therefore the greatest conceivable being must be real." This is merely an identity, not a proof of the existence of god.
Posted by tspr at March 20, 2005 04:21 PM